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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal case in which the defendant was
charged with having in his possession a dangerous weapon after
having been convicted of a crime of violence, in violation of
Section 76-10-503, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The defendant was found guilty, by a jury, of the
crime of possession of a dangerous weapon by a convicted person, after trial of the matter before the Honorable J. Robert
Bullock, Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, by this appeal, seeks to have the jury
verdict vacated and the matter remanded to the Fourth Judicial
District Court for a new trial upon the ground and for the

reasons as stated herein.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Throughout this brief, the party appellant, Parley
Edward Nielsen, will be referred to as the defendant, and the
party respondent, The State of Utah, will be referred to as
the plaintiff.
On the 21st day of December, 1972, the defendant,
Parley Edward Nielsen, was convicted by a jury of the charge
of assault with a deadly weapon.

(Tr.ll).

Defendant was later

sentenced to the Utah State Prison pursuant to the requirements
of the statute and was later paroled from said prison during the
early summer of 1974.
On the 7th day of December, 19 74, the defendant visited
at "Al's Lounge" (actually named Carolyn's Billiards Tr.40) in
Pleasant Grove, Utah.

The defendant was in the lounge between

the hours of 7:00 ofclock p.m. and midnight.

The lounge was

dimly lit and in certain areas was rather dark, particularly in
the area where the bar is located.

(Tr.58).

The defendant

visited with one Jolene Smith at the bar and then seated himself in an eating booth where he engaged in a conversation with
one Pat Truman.

(Tr.93).

The defendant had an M-l carbine clip

in his hand and handed it to Pat Truman.

Pat Truman took the

bullets out of the clip and handed the clip and bullets back
to the defendant separately.

(Tr.93-94).

During the process

of removing the cartridges from the clip, some of them were
dropped on the table of the eating booth attracting the attention of other persons in the lounge.

(Tr.94).

Sometime later

the defendant left the lounge and did not return.
On the 3rd and 6th of January, 1975, a warrant of
arrest and complaint were issued respectively.

Upon defen-

dant's hearing of the warrant for his arrest he visited the
police station in Pleasant Grove and was there arrested on the
charge of being in possession of a dangerous weapon after having committed and being convicted of a crime of violence.

On

January 9, 1975, the defendant was arraigned and given a copy
of the Complaint.

Preliminary hearing was set for the 20th

of January, 1975, and continued to the 10th of February, 1975.
.The defendant was bound over for arraignment on the 21st of
February, 19 75, and was arraigned before the Fourth District
Court for Utah County on the 28th of February, 19 75.

There-

after, on the 7th day of March, 19 75, the defendant entered
his plea of not guilty.

The matter was tried on the 8th day

of April, 19 75, before the Fourth District Court, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock sitting, and after trial of the*matter
the jury returned a verdict of guilty and the defendant was
sentenced to. the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years.
The defendant requested the appointment of counsel to
prosecute his case on appeal.

Counsel was appointed and this

appeal has been brought pursuant to said appointment and the
defendant's request.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS
NUMBERED 6 AND 7.
The defendant was charged with violation of Section
76-10-503, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, entitled "Possession of
Dangerous Weapon by Convicted Person, Drug Addict, or Mentally
Incompetent Person Prohibited."

The pertinent language of the

statute is as follows:
"Any person who is not a citizen of the United
States, or any person who has been convicted of
any crime of violence under the laws of
the State of Utah
shall not own or have in
his possession or under his custody or control
any dangerous weapon as defined in this part.
Any person who violates this section is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous
weapon is a firearm or a sawed-off shotgun he
shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree."
In Section 76-10-501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the
words "dangerous weapon" and "firearm" are defined.

In sub-

paragraph 1 of said section the definition of dangerous weapon appears and the language is as follows:
"Dangerous weapon means any item that in the
manner of its use or intended use is capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury. In
construing whether an item, object, or thing
not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a
dangerous weapon, the character of the instrument, object, or thing; the character of the
wound produced, if any; and the manner in which
the instrument, object, or thing was used shall
be determinative."

In sub-paragraph 2 of said section, the word "firearm"
is defined as follows:

!

"Firearms means pistols, revolvers, sawed-off
shotguns, or sawed-off rifles, and/or any device
that could be used as a weapon from which is
expelled a projectile by any force."
In instructing the jury as to the law set forth in the
above sections of the Utah Criminal Code, the Court gave its
instructions numbered 6 and 7 which are as follows:
"Instruction No. 6
"The essential elements of the crime charged in
the information are as follows: (1) That the
defendant had a gun in his possession on or about
December 7, 1974; (2) That sometime previously
he had been convicted of a crime of violence under
the laws of the state of Utah.
"If you believe that the evidence establishes both
of the above elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant; if the evidence has failed to so establish
either of said elements, then you should find the
defendant not guilty."
"Instruction No. 7
"For your purposes in determining guilt or innocence of the defendant, assault with a deadly
weapon is a crime of violence, and a pistol-type
handgun is a dangerous weapon under the laws of
this state. However, a gun clip alone with or
without cartridges in it is not a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the law under which the
defendant is charged."
With respect to the first instruction, Instruction No.
6, defendant contends that in light of the evidence adduced at
the trial that the word "gun" was improper and prejudicial and
that the instruction should have read under the paragraph

numbered 1 thereof:

"That the defendant had a dangerous weapon

in his possession on or about December 7, 1974,"
At the trial evidence was adduced by witnesses for the
state that the defendant had in his hand and was waving, an object which appeared to some of the witnesses to be a pistol or
handgun.

A Mr. Kent Gurney was called by the state and testi-

fied that he was the owner of the lounge at which the defendant
was present on the night in question.

He further testified that

he saw "what I thought looked like" a gun in the hand of the
defendant.

(Tr.52).

On cross examination Mr. Gurney testified,

upon being shown the M-l carbine magazine, that he "couldn't
swear that it (the carbine magazine) wasn't" the object that he
saw in the hand of the defendant. (Tr.61).

Further, the witness

testified that he had been drinking and he did not recall specifically whether the item or object in the hand of the defendant
was made out of metal or plastic or whether or not the object
was a gun at all.

(Tr.61-62).

A Mr. Craig Brackenbury was

called and testified that he had come into the bar; that he did
not know the defendant prior thereto, and that he saw a gun or
what appeared to be a gun tucked into the waistband of#the
pants of the defendant with the handle portion of said object
or gun exposed.

(Tr. 71-73).

A Mrs. Evelyn Ekins was called

as a witness for the state and testified that she was working
in the lounge on the night in question as a cocktail waitress.

-6-

She recalled the defendant coming to the lounge and that she
saw what appeared to be a gun in his hand.

(Tr.76-78).

There-

after, a Miss Pat Truman was called to testify for the state,
was declared an adverse witness, and on cross examination by
counsel for the state testified that she had seen the M-l
carbine magazine in the hand of the defendant, that she had
obtained it from him, extracted the cartridges therefrom, some
of which dropped on the table, and handed back to the defendant
the magazine housing and the unexpired cartridges.

Miss Truman

further testified that she did not see at any time any object
such as a revolver or a pistol-type handgun in the hand of the
defendant or on his person.

(Tr.93-94).

The state also pro-

duced a witness by the name of Greg Smith who testified that
he was with the defendant prior to going into the lounge aforesaid, and that the defendant had in his possession a magazine
or clip to a pistol.

(Tr.39-44).

The defendant in his case produced a witness by the
name of Corrine McDuffy who testified that she was the owner
of the clip in question and that she had given it to the defendant for the purpose of having it repaired and that it was to
be returned to her on the night in question.

(Tr.105-108).

The defendant also produced a witness by the name of Jolene
Smith, wife of the state's witness, Greg Smith, and she testified that she did not at any time see a gun in the hand of the
defendant.

(Tr.114).

Finally, it was stipulated that the M-l

•'"
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carbine magazine would not operate in any handgun, revolver,
or pistol, nor could it be adapted for such use.

(Tr. 104).

From the evidence the jury could have concluded that
the defendant either had a magazine with unexpired cartridges,
a clip for a handgun, or a pistol-type gun.

Thus, it was

erroneous for the Court to instruct the jury that the essential
elements of the crime charged were that the defendant had a gun
in his possession on or about the 7th day of December, 19 74.
Rather, the jury should have been instructed that the defendant
' had a dangerous weapon in his possession on or about the 7th
day of December, 1974, inasmuch as it was the jury's prerogative
to decide the question of whether the object or thing in

the

possession of the defendant was a gun or some other object.
With regard to Instruction No. 7, the defendant contends that the Court erred in instructing the jury that a
pistol-type handgun is a dangerous weapon under the laws of
the State of Utah.

By the definition and language of the stat-

ute a dangerous weapon is an "item that in the manner of its
use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury."

Further, firearms is defined to include pis-

tols or revolvers.

However, by the language of the statute it

does not follow that a firearm, to-wit:
is a dangerous weapon per se.

a pistol or revolver,

That is, the language of the

statute seems to suggest that even in determining whether a
pistol or revolver is a dangerous weapon one must consider

' -8-

..

:

-

•

.

:

\

whether said item in its use or intended use would be likely
to cause serious bodily injury or death.

The jury was not

instructed in this manner and it is defendant's position and
contention that were the jury instructed to consider whether
or not the item in the possession of the defendant were a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the words "dangerous weapon"
that the jury could have found that the item in the possession
of the the defendant, whether or not a pistol, was not a dangerous weapon by reason of its being rendered incapable of
causing serious bodily injury or death.
POINT II

|

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1.
At the trial, the defendant presented four jury instructions which he requested the Court to give to the jury.

Two of

the instructions were not given and two were given in an
amended form.

The instruction which was not given and which

defendant claims should have been given is as follows:
"Instruction No. 1. You are instructed that
a dangerous weapon means any item that in the
manner of its use or intended use is capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury. You
are further instructed that in construing
whether an item, object, or thing not commonly
known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous
weapon, the character of the instrument,
object, or thing and the manner in which the
instrument, object, or thing was used shall
be determinative."
Defendant contends that the above instruction should
have been given for the reason that under the state of the

evidence, after conclusion thereof, the jury was faced with
the question whether the defendant had in his possession a
pistol or the magazine to an M-1 carbine rifle and also the
question whether the firearm was loaded or unloaded.

Further,

there was a question presented in the evidence of whether the
pistol, if any, was capable of causing serious bodily injury
or death.

That is, the jury could have believed both that the

defendant did have a pistol and that he also had a magazine
for an M-1 carbine rifle, but would still be required to determine whether the pistol was loaded or whether it was capable
of being used in conjunction with the M-1 carbine magazine and
unexpired cartridges therein.
Defendant contends that it was prejudicial error for
the Court to instruct the jury simply that a hand-type pistol
is a dangerous weapon without giving the definition of a dangerous weapon and impressing upon the mind of the jury their
need to consider the questions suggested above.
Generally, it is held that an unloaded gun, used as
a firearm and not as a bludgeon, is not a dangerous weapon within
the contemplation of statutes punishing assaults made with dangerous or deadly weapons.
Section 3.

79 Am Jur 2d Weapons and Firearms,

There is also authority that an unloaded revolver

or gun merely pointed at the person is not a dangerous weapon
within the meaning of statutes defining assault and battery
while armed with a dangerous weapon.

-10-

79 Am Jur 2d Weapons and

Firearms, Section 3.

Defendant recognizes and admits that

there is a division of authority on the question of whether
a firearm or handgun is a dangerous weapon per se, However,
most of the cases seem to turn on the question of whether the .....
particular firearm or handgun was loaded and on the question
of what particular use or intended use the handgun or firearm
was put to in the commission of the offense.

Thus, in the

case of People v. Ford, 36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 388 P2d 892, the
Court suggested that a pistol-type handgun is not dangerous
per se to a burglar who steals an unloaded revolver as part of
his loot.

From said case, it appears that a pistol must be

used in perpetration of a felony in order to be considered dangerous.

In State vs. Petersen, 83 Utah 74, 27 P2d 20, an assault

case, wherein an assault was allegedly made by use of a pistol
or handgun, the Supreme Court found that the gun was a deadly
weapon because it was loaded and implied that were the gun unloaded that it would not have been considered a deadly weapon,
per se.

Thus, the question of whether or not a pistol-type

handgun would be considered a dangerous weapon per se in the
State of Utah does not seem to have been decided by the Supreme
Court.
In light of the division of authority on the question
of whether a handgun or pistol should be considered a dangerous
weapon per se and because the question does not seem to have
been decided in the State of Utah, defendant offers the following analogies to emphasize what he contends the intent of the

-11-

\

Legislature to have been in enacting the provisions of.the
Criminal Code dealing with weapons: A person convicted of a
crime of violence could have in his possession or under his
custody and control a replica model of any type of weapon or
firearm as a collector item.

Since such models are not capable

of being fired and are declared by the federal government as
"non-guns", for which no license is required, it is feasible
that such a weapon or replica of a weapon could be in the
possession or control or under the custody of a person previously convicted of a crime of violence.

However, even such

a firearm, although a replica only, could, under our current
statutes, be said to be a "dangerous weapon" if in the manner
of its use or intended use it was capable of causing serious
bodily injury or death, and a person having such a model or
replica of a gun in his possession or under his custody and
control and using it thusly, could be found guilty of the provisions of Section 76-10-503, UCA, 1953. On the other hand,
it is also within the ambit of our statute that a person previously convicted of a crime of violence could have in his
possession an actual handgun or pistol as a collector's item
and, although capable of firing, if said handgun or weapon in
its use or intended use was not capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury, then the person having it in his custody or under his control would not be in violation of Section
76-10-503, UCA, 1953.

Thus, by the language and intent of

-12t

the statute, defendant argues that a consideration of the use
to which the alleged dangerous weapon was put is indispensable
to a determination of whether said alleged dangerous weapon
was in fact a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the language of the statute.

Thus, the Court's failure to so instruct

the jury as requested by the defendant in its instruction aforesaid, was clearly erroneous, prejudicial, and by such error
defendant was denied a fair trial.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT'S CASE SHOULD BE REVERSED AND
REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR RE-HEARING
AND REDETERMINATION.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held in cases where
the trial court has issued an improper and prejudicial jury
instruction, that the case must be remanded for new trial. State
of Utah vs. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 439, 519 P2d 247 (1974); State of
Utah v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 2d 323, 234 P2d 600 (1951).
CONCLUSION
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in giving
instructions numbered 6 and 7 in that it failed to instruct the
jury in the proper language as set forth in the statute for
which the defendant was charged with violating, and further,
in instructing that a handgun or pistol-type gun is a dangerous
weapon per se within the meaning of Section 76-10-501
Criminal Code.

(1) Utah

Further, defendant contends that his requested

-13-

\

jury instruction should have been given and that failure to
give such was prejudicial to his case, did not allow the jury
to decide whether the item or thing which he allegedly had was
a dangerous weapon, and left the jury only to decide whether
or not they believed he had a gun.
\

The language of Section 76-10-501 in conjunction with
Section 76-10-503, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, requires a consideration of the use or intended use to which an item or thing
is put, in the commission or attempted commission of an offense,
to determine whether said item or thing is a dangerous weapon
within the meaning of the words "dangerous weapon" as defined.
Thus, defendant respectfully submits that his case has been
prejudiced, that he has been denied fair trial, and that by
reason of the error committed by the trial court, his case
should be remanded for new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
GARY H. WEIGHT
ALDRICH & NELSON
43 East 200 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Tel: 373-4912
Attorneys for Appellant
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